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Reciprocity in International
Telecommunications Trade:
A New Trade Barrier?
Sheryl Powers*
INTRODUCTION
United States trade policy is at a cross-roads. Since World War II, the
United States has encouraged expansion of trade through multilateral
negotiations. I Designed to provide each participant with benefits that in
the aggregate correspond to each party's concessions, these negotiations
led to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and produced
an unprecedented era of prosperous international trade. 2
Recent complaints about restricted foreign markets, however, have
caused some legislators to question whether the United States has given
away more than it has received. 3 In the 97th Congress, over 250 bills were
introduced which required or authorized the United States to demand
"reciprocity" from its trading partners. 4 Most bills defined reciprocity as
"equivalent commercial opportunities," 5 which on its face seems a fair
request to make of other nations. But many bills required the United States
to retaliate against non-reciprocating nations by erecting trade barriers in
the United States similar to those in uncooperative nations. 6 This approach
represents a break with traditional United States policy and has created a
continuing controversy in Congress. 7
To those advocating its use, reciprocity legislation is especially appro-
priate for the telecommunications industry. Only 5 percent of telecom-
munications equipment manufactured in the United States is exported for
sale in other nations. 8 Trade barriers, loyalty to domestic manufacturers
and the importance of telecommunications to national defense systems
have combined to restrict access to foreign markets in the telecommunica-
tions sector. To persuade other nations to increase market access in tele-
communications, United States legislators added a requirement of
reciprocity to two proposed bills, S.898 9 and H.R.5158.1 0 This note will
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examine these two bills, concluding that reciprocity is an inappropriate
solution to United States concerns about foreign trade restrictions.
Background of Reciprocity
Reciprocity is not a new concept. Between the two world wars, the United
States applied reciprocity bilaterally, attempting to balance trade with each
nation. The results were disastrous and led to retaliatory trade practices. I'
Against this background, the GATT was formed in 1947 by the United
States and its major trading partners to "maintain a general level of recip-
rocal and mutually advantageous concessions." 12 This principle is known
as "global reciprocity." 13 In the Trade Act of 1974, Congress included the
idea of reciprocity as a negotiating objective. 14
Much of the recent controversy over reciprocity has focused on its value
as a formal requirement in United States law versus its value as an informal
objective in trade negotiations. Is Advocates of reciprocity believe that
currently the United States lacks leverage in negotiations because it has
already conceded as much as it can; 16 a threat that United States markets
will close is necessary to persuade other nations to open theirs. Reciprocity
legislation would provide negotiators with a bottom line. 17 As a mere
informal objective, reciprocity gives negotiators neither sanctions nor in-
centives to induce countries to open their markets. 18 Thus, to provide
leverage to open foreign telecommunications markets, reciprocity and the
authority to retaliate were added to S.898 and H.R.5158.
S.898 § 238 AND H.R.5158 § 267, THE RECIPROCITY PROVISIONS
Both S.898 and H.R 5158 are concerned primarily with deregulation in the
United States telecommunications industry. 19 Reciprocity was added to
these bills partly from a concern that deregulation would result in greater
numbers of foreign firms entering the United States market, 20 especially
since Western Europe and Japan have targeted the telecommunications
industry for major expansion. 21 Protecting United States domestic markets
from foreign expansion may receive support because the telecommunica-
tions industry is seen as vital to national security and United States techno-
logical competitiveness. 22 The industry is also valuable in purely monetary
terms, as the United States market for telecommunications equipment
alone is worth an estimated $15 billion. 23
Another reason for the addition of reciprocity provisions was the desire
to open foreign markets to United States telecommunications firms. 24 An
estimated 96 percent of foreign telephone operating companies are govern-
ment owned 25 and purchase their equipment and services by law, regula-
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tion, or custom from local companies. 26 The loyalty to local industry
results from a desire "to safeguard a continuing supply of equipment for
a vital, critical industry ... to add to the country's knowledge of technolo-
gy, and to provide jobs." 27 In the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations, the
United States attempted 28 to include government-owned telecommunica-
tions entities in the Government Procurement Code 29 which forbids dis-
crimination on the basis of national origin in government purchasing.
Unfortunately, this attempt failed, hardening the United States' conviction
that new leverage was needed to persuade other nations to open their
markets to American telecommunications equipment and services. 30
In addition to government procurement policies, other trade barriers
hamper American exports of telecommunications equipment and services.
For example, many countries allow a foreign firm to establish a local
subsidiary only if the subsidiary is primarily owned by a local partner.
American firms consider such an arrangement disadvantageous because it
entails a loss of control over operations and technology often developed
at great expense. 31 Since the sale of telecommunications equipment and
services often requires the establishment of a local subsidiary, 32 American
firms reluctant to lose control may be precluded from trade with nations
requiring major local ownership. Other countries have prescribed stan-
dards for telecommunications services and equipment which, by design or
administration, exclude foreign vendors. 33 The United States Trade Rep-
resentative's list of barriers to telecommunications, data and information
services 34 illustrates the pervasiveness of foreign trade restrictions in this
industry. 35
S.898 § 238 36 and H.R.5158 § 267 37 authorize the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) to apply to foreign telecommunications firms in
the United States the same terms and conditions applied to United States
firms in the foreign firms' "home" nations. Both sections provide that a
foreign country cannot prevent the application of restrictions against its
firms by merely concluding an agreement on telecommunications equip-
ment procurement with the United States. The country must actually
ensure that American firms are granted "reciprocal rights." 38 Reciprocal
rights are defined as the rights granted United States telecommunications
facilities in foreign markets which are reasonably equivalent to those
granted foreign enterprises in the United States itself. 39
Both sections authorize the Secretary of Commerce to monitor the im-
plementation of reciprocity in consultation with the FCC and the Office
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). 40 The USTR is required
to compile a list of countries that are non-reciprocating. 41 This list will be
used to deny certain telecommunications equipment certification 4 2 or in-
terconnection rights 43 when more than one-half its total value has been
added in a "nonreciprocating" country on the list.
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Although the provisions of the bills are similar, they scrutinize different
aspects of the treatment United States firms receive in foreign countries.
Section 267 imposes on foreign firms the conditions of operation applied to
United States firms abroad while § 238 imposes the conditions of entry
applied to United States firms abroad. 44 Conditions of entry are the restric-
tions facing firms entering a foreign market for the first time; for example,
obtaining a license to do business in the foreign country. Conditions of
operation are the restrictions facing firms already in the foreign country;
for instance, meeting an additional standard on telecommunications
equipment required only of foreign firms. Obviously, there is some overlap
in these two concepts. It is unclear whether in application either would
result in a noticeable difference from the other.
These sections differ in scope in two additional ways. First, although
both sections 238 and 267 apply the conditions of the foreign nation in
which the foreign telecommunications firm is based, 45 section 267 broad-
ens its application to the conditions of the nation under whose law the
foreign firm's transmissions or services originate, terminate or are regulat-
ed. 46 Section 238 contains only the addition of the nation under whose law
the foreign firm was established. 47 Second, section 238 applies to "tele-
communications or information services, facilities or equipment," while
section 267 is limited to "telecommunications services or facilities." 48
Thus, although section 238 is broader in its coverage of equipment, section
267 is broader in its coverage of the foreign nations under scrutiny.
Section 238 includes a provision omitted from section 267. The Presi-
dent is authorized to veto FCC decisions for foreign policy reasons after
consulting with Commerce, USTR, and State. 49 Section 267, however,
exempts "services and facilities offered on the effective date of this sec-
tion," 5 0 while section 238 contains no "grandfather" provision.
Reciprocity Under Fire
Reciprocity has generated many heated controversies since its introduction
in the 97th Congress. Critics have maintained that reciprocity is unsound
economically, is infeasible administratively, and is inconsistent with Unit-
ed States international obligations. Each of these areas will be analyzed
below.
Economic Disadvantages
In §§ 238 and 267, reciprocity is measured on both a bilateral (nation-to-
nation) and sectoral (market sector-to-market sector) basis. For example,
§§ 238 and 267 would compare Japan's treatment of United States telecom-
munications facilities with the treatment of Japan's telecommunications
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facilities by the United States, a market sector and nation to nation com-
parison. Ambassador Brock, the United States Trade Representative, has
opposed bilateral reciprocity because it undermines the multilateral ap-
proach to trade inherent in the GATT which is responsible for the current
low level of tariffs on trade. 
5 1
Brock and others have also opposed sectoral reciprocity because it ig7
nores comparative economic advantages between nations. 52 Nations are
not equally efficient at producing every good or service. Therefore, they
have an incentive to export products they produce relatively efficiently and
import products they produce relatively inefficiently. Some critics fear that
sectoral reciprocity may be used to equalize trade between nations in each
product line, thereby impairing the incentive to trade. 5 3 Without this
incentive, the United States could lose leverage in trade negotiations. Sec-
tions 238 and 267, however, require only equivalent treatment, not equal
levels of trade in the telecommunications sector. It is unclear whether these
sections would be interpreted as mandating an equal balance in telecom-
munications trade.
Many commentators have expressed their concern that nations subject
to United States reciprocity restrictions will retaliate. 5 4 Opponents of reci-
procity in the telecommunications sector have emphasized that the United
States has a trading advantage in this area. As a result, other countries may
be entirely willing to adopt a protectionist approach in the telecommunica-
tions field in response to American restrictions. 55 In addition, those with
whom the United States maintains a positive balance of trade, such as the
European Communities, may be quick to adopt reciprocity as their stan-
dard to equalize their balance of trade with the United States. 56 If Ameri-
can reciprocity leads to wide-spread adoption of trade restrictions, the
United States would have much to lose as imports and exports account for
approximately one-fifth of the United States gross national product. 57
As critics of reciprocity have noted, the United States has many trade
barriers of its own. 58 An example in the telecommunications field is the
United States ban on foreign ownership of television and radio licenses. 5 9
If the United States were to adopt reciprocity, its own trade barriers would
give other nations reason to demand reciprocity or to retaliate them-
selves. 60
Nations have traditionally been concerned about their relative balances
of trade. Reciprocity proponents have become alarmed at recent United
States deficits and have urged that the United States take serious action to
offset them. 61 In 1981, the United States trade deficit was approximately
$28 billion. The deficit with Japan alone was in the order of $16 billion. 62
Those who advocate reciprocity apparently assume this deficit is due
primarily to open markets in the United States and closed markets abroad.
But several commentators assert that market factors such as interest rates,
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availability of capital, lack of skilled manpower, and research and develop-
ment opportunities are the predominant reasons for poor United States
trade performance. 
63
The United States has recently had high interest rates which resulted in
an influx of foreign investment. 64 In turn, the dollar has been strengthened
vis-a-vis other currencies, making imports relatively inexpensive in the
United States and United States goods relatively expensive abroad. 65 For
example, the dollar is at least 25 percent overvalued in relation to the
Japanese yen. 66 As a result, United States goods are at a competitive
disadvantage in Japan quite apart from the market restrictions commonly
attributed to the Japanese. 67 To state that our $16 billion trade deficit with
Japan is the result of Japanese trade restrictions on United States imports
underestimates the effect of current exchange rates. A United States trade
policy of retaliation against foreign trade restrictions would be ineffective
partly because it ignores the impact of interest and exchange rates as well
as other economic factors on United States trade performance.
Moreover, the United States trade deficit in itself is a misleading indica-
tion of overall American competitiveness. For example, trade deficit figures
include only trade in merchandise. When services and investment are also
counted, the 1981 deficit was more than offset, resulting in a surplus of $4.5
billion. 68 Furthermore, the trade deficit reports the overall balance of trade,
not the balance within a particular industry. 69 In the telecommunications
equipment industry, the United States has a trade surplus, 70 with imports
accounting for only 4 percent of American consumption of telecommuni-
cations equipment. 71
Nevertheless, a positive current account "is not a measure of whether
a given American corporation is able to compete because of the presence
of equitable rules." 72 Despite the positive numbers, many American busi-
ness people object to the formal trade barriers in foreign countries, espe-
cially when firms in those countries have access to markets in the United
States. It is, perhaps, this sense of unfairness, that the United States has
maintained free access to its markets while its trading partners have not,
however accurate the perception may or may not be, that motivates those
demanding reciprocity.
Whether all participants maintain equally open markets or not, interna-
tional trade has many benefits, even on a unilateral basis. Competition
from imports results in lower prices for United States consumers and may
reduce overall inflation rates. 73 Imports give United States firms access to
foreign technological advances and, according to some United States firms,
push technological development as United States firms strive to compete
with advanced imports. 74 Although banning a foreign product or service
may provide protection for United States companies in the same line, it
may also result in higher prices for domestic companies that use the pro-
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duct or service. Reciprocity may shelter United States firms now competing
with imports only at the cost of United States exporting firms losing
markets abroad if other nations retaliate. Furthermore:
Restrictions on imports reduce other countries' exports and hence the foreign
exchange available to them for importing. Reduced imports mean that some-
one else's exports eventually will decline. Arguably, in the long run, jobs can
be saved in import competing industries only at the expense of jobs "lost"
in export-competing industries. 75
Reciprocity may carry hidden costs to the entire United States economy.
DISADVANTAGES OF RECIPROCITY
PROVISIONS IN S.898 AND H.R.5158
Broad Powers Granted the FCC
The main provisions of §§ 238 and 267 appear to grant the FCC the power
to replicate any foreign government law or practice which affects the entry
or operation of United States telecommunications companies abroad. 76
This open-ended mandate could include application of foreign antitrust,
tax, environmental, employment, securities, land use, and health and safe-
ty laws and regulations. 77 If so applied, §§ 238 and 267 would result in
numerous and possibly contradictory FCC rules mirroring the trade restric-
tions of other nations. Each foreign nation and each foreign product and
service might require different treatment, depending on the treatment
given United States products and services abroad. Administration of such
a system would be frought with difficulties and would give the FCC
powers not usually accorded regulatory agencies.
Objections have been voiced on the authority granted the FCC in §§ 238
and 267. In each provision, the FCC is given the power to determine the
conditions under which "foreign" telecommunications firms may operate
in the United States. 78 The FCC has indicated that it already has the
authority to scrutinize "foreign carrier reciprocal practices" when review-
ing carrier tariffs 79 and determining whether they are in the public interest
under §§ 208, 209, and 210 of the 1934 Communications Act. 8 0 Part of the
FCC's scrutiny includes consideration of terms applied to United States
firms abroad when deciding whether to permit a foreign carrier to enter the
United States market or establish facilities. 81 The FCC, however, wel-
comed § 238 because the 1934 Act does not explicitly provide for reciproci-
ty authority and the FCC's use of that authority had never been tested in
court. 82 Consequently, the FCC indicated it has exercised its authority
with caution. 83
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Commentators almost universally criticized the amount of discretion
given the FCC by §§ 238 and 267. The major fear was that this provision
would result in an uncoordinated trade policy, 8 4 as the FCC is an indepen-
dent regulatory agency and therefore not directly subject to Executive
Branch control. 85
Sections 238 and 267 do, however, impose some limits on the FCC's
powers. The Secretary of Commerce would monitor the FCC's implemen-
tation of its power, in consultation with the FCC and the USTR, but
without a voice in the FCC's decisions. 86 Section 267(e) requires the FCC
to consult with Commerce, the USTR, State and any other federal officer
designated by the President.8 7 Nevertheless, the FCC alone decides
whether to impose trade restrictions. Although § 238(d) does grant the
President 45 days to veto FCC decisions, 88 § 267 does not contain a veto
provision. Many critics thought § 267 would interfere with the President's
power to conduct foreign relations "with a unified voice" 89 and to negoti-
ate reductions in foreign trade barriers in the telecommunications sector. 90
Some commentators questioned the constitutionality of § 267 because it
allows the FCC to encroach upon the President's exclusive right to conduct
foreign relations. 91
Other critics questioned the ability and resources of the FCC to handle
the complicated determinations required by §§ 238 and 267, such as dis-
cerning the origin of products and services. 92 Finally, one critic noted the
potential conflict with the USTR which was established to coordinate trade
policy. 93 In sum, the consensus was against granting the FCC, an indepen-
dent regulatory agency, the power to make decisions pregnant with inter-
national policy implications.
Over-inclusiveness
A major problem with S.898 and H.R.5158 lies in their definitions of a
"foreign" entity. The broad language would capture what many believe are
United States firms. S.898 § 103(15) stipulates that an "enterprise" or
"entity" is foreign when at least 20 percent of the firm is owned or con-
trolled by a foreign person. 94 Thus, a firm that was 80 percent American
owned would be categorized as foreign. H.R.5158 § 301(36) follows the 20
percent restriction of S.898 § 103(15). 9 Aside from discouraging joint
ventures which provide a means to exploit foreign technology under at
least partial American control, 96 this definition could impose economically
costly restrictions on companies primarily owned by United States citizens,
whether the firms are located abroad or in the United States. 97 Since the
definitions do not exclude "foreign-owned" firms based in the United
States, 98 §§ 267 and 238 may jeopardize the jobs of United States citizens
IMPACT OF REGULATION ON INT'L COMMUNICATIONS 177
employed by those companies. 99 The costs of implementing §§ 238 and
267 may thus be inadvertently borne by United States citizens.
In addition to catching "innocent" American firms in its net, § 267
ensnares foreign firms from "innocent" nations. In § 267(a)(2), a foreign
firm is granted reciprocity on the terms and conditions United States firms
face not only in the foreign company's home nation, but also in any nation
which receives the foreign company's transmissions. 100 Therefore, a for-
eign company could confront restrictions based on the trade barriers of a
nation merely receiving its transmissions even though its own home nation
granted United States firms full market access. Not only does this seem
likely to offend nations willing to reduce their trade barriers, but also it
appears to be an ineffective tool against nations receiving transmissions.
If a nation is not seeking access to the United States market, any restriction
the United States places on its neighbors is unlikely to affect its practices.
If it is seeking access, the United States can judge that nation according to
its own barriers without unnecessarily penalizing its cooperative neigh-
bors.
Section 267 and § 238 also demand that foreign nations refrain from
"encouraging" or "condoning" practices of domestic manufacturers inhib-
iting the sales of United States telecommunications facilities. 101 Although
a nation may grant United States firms market access, this provision may
require it to impose a regulatory scheme on private companies to avoid
"condoning" practices which adversely affect United States firms. It is one
thing to request a nation to implement nondiscrimination in government
procurement but quite another to insist it become the watchdog of private
firms over whom the government may have little legal control. It seems
unlikely such a "request" will obtain the cooperation of foreign nations
which have refrained from imposing regulatory restraints on their tele-
communications industries.
A third difficulty occurs in the application of restrictions to "foreign"
firms currently in the United States. Section 267(h) exempts "services and
facilities offered on the effective date of this section" 10 2 but § 238 does not
contain a similar "grandfather" clause. Thus, under § 238, the FCC could
impose restrictions on foreign firms which entered the United States mar-
ket without prior notice of a reciprocity law. One critic questioned wheth-
er the imposition of restraints on such firms would be a taking of property
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 103 Even
if the imposition of a new reciprocity law does not rise to the level of a
taking, it does present difficulties for foreign firms already established in
the United States which would not have entered with prior notice of the
law. These difficulties will probably become the subject of complaints
against the United States by the home countries of those firms.
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Value-added Provisions
The "value-added" provisions of H.R. 5158 and S.898, which allow the
FCC to place restrictions on certain equipment if more than one-half of its
value was added in a "non-reciprocating" nation, have been heavily criti-
cized. 104 Which nations are considered non-reciprocating is subject to
change 105 leaving United States firms with uncertainty as to what equip-
ment is safe to order in advance. Equipment without restrictions one
month may carry restraints the next, too late for American companies to
cancel their orders or to use the equipment in the United States as planned.
Furthermore, determining the ultimate source of components, as these
provisions require, may prove administratively difficult and time-consum-
ing. Tracing the origin of equipment probably would entail the cooperation
of exporting nations reluctant to aid a process which may label their
equipment as unmarketable in the United States.
In addition, these provisions would allow restrictions to be placed on
products manufactured and sold by wholly-owned United States compa-
nies if over half the total value of the products were attributable to compo-
nents from non-reciprocating nations. 106 Although aimed at foreign
nations, these provisions may injure United States firms unaware that
certain components carry an automatic penalty. Further, they present
severe administrative problems and introduce uncertainties in the interna-
tional telecommunications market.
Inconsistency with United States International Obligations
Reciprocity as embodied in §§ 238 and 267 ignores several United States
international obligations. The United States, like most of its trading part-
ners, is a member of the GATT. The GATT contains an unconditional
"most favored nation" principle ("MFN") which requires its members to
grant each other treatment equal to that accorded any other trading part-
ner. 107 If the FCC, for example, were to restrict telecommunications im-
ports from Japan, without applying those restrictions against all other
GATT signatories, the United States would be violating its MFN obliga-
tion toward Japan. Under the GATT, Japan may be entitled to compensa-
tion for the United States violation. 108
Second, the GATT forbids its signatories to impose restrictions on the
internal sale, distribution and use of imported goods which are not also
imposed on domestic goods, a concept known as the national treatment
principle. 109 Yet §§ 238 and 267 violate this principle by authorizing the
FCC to apply internal restrictions solely on imported goods, such as the
denial of interconnection rights.
Furthermore, GAT requires certain objective standards 110 or interna-
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tional procedures I I to be followed before a member can retaliate against
or remove a concession from another GATT member. Under §§ 238 and
267, the FCC is allowed to take unilateral action against GATT signatories
without regard to GATT procedures and standards. The United States may
anticipate difficulties in convincing its trading partners to comply with the
GATT if it ignores GATT principles in a new reciprocity law.
In addition to ignoring GATT obligations, §§ 238 and 267 explicitly
require the FCC to disregard existing or prospective agreements on tele-
communications equipment procurement if, in the FCC's judgment, the
other nation is not in full compliance with the agreement, it allows United
States firms access under conditions which distort "research and develop-
ment, investment, sales or marketing," or it condones domestic manufac-
turer practices which inhibit sales of United States telecommunications
facilities. 112 Under §§ 238 and 267, the FCC may effectively repudiate
United States treaties and agreements such as the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Agreement with Japan. 113 In this agreement, Japan promised to
provide United States telecommunications firms with competitive oppor-
tunities in its procurement procedures. 114 Unilateral FCC action could
ironically result in closing the markets of foreign nations now pledged to
provide United States firms with access.
CONCLUSION
From a pragmatic as well as a legal viewpoint, §§ 238 and 267 appear faulty
and unworkable. Although definitional problems such as applying restric-
tions to firms 80 percent owned by United States citizens can be cured by
redrafting, major difficulties, such as provoking world-wide retaliation,
may prove insurmountable in any legislation requiring reciprocity from
United States trading partners. But with growing unemployment and a
deepening recession, pressure on Congress to act is likely to continue.
Therefore, alternatives to reciprocity and to the threat of retaliation must
be considered.
GATT Article XXII Proceedings
Article XXIII of GATT provides for compensatory measures when a na-
tion's benefits under GAIT are "nullified and impaired." 115 The Consum-
ers for World Trade have urged the United States to initiate GAIT Article
XXIII proceedings instead of legislating reciprocity. 116 GAIT, however,
only applies to merchandise; neither investment nor services are explicitly
covered. 117 Since investment and services are crucial to the telecommuni-
cations industry, GATT as it now stands may provide little aid to United
180 REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS
States telecommunications firms. Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Bal-
drige 118 and United States Trade Representative William Brock 119 have
advised Congress to provide the President with authority to negotiate in
the areas of services and investments. With this authority, Brock hopes the
United States can persuade its trading partners to extend the coverage of
GATT and other international agreements to services and investments as
a means of reducing trade barriers in those areas. 120
Internal Procedures of Other Nations
An alternative more likely to provide access to foreign markets than the
threat of retaliation is the use of a foreign nation's own laws. Geza
Feketekuty, Assistant United States Trade Representative for Policy De-
velopment, recently recounted one successful use of this strategy. Germa-
ny had established a telecommunications data information system for air
reservations which excluded all airlines except Lufthansa or those with
whom Lufthansa had a pooling arrangement. Since the United States anti-
trust laws prohibited pooling arrangements with foreign airlines, United
States firms were automatically excluded. When this practice was brought
before the German Cartel Office, the Office declared it invalid and required
the reservations system to include other airlines. 121 Mr. Feketekuty
testified that the strategy of using the internal procedures and laws of other
nations has proved successful in other cases, and urged United States
telecommunications firms to use this avenue for relief more vigorously. 122
Improve United States Economic Conditions
High interest rates in the United States have strengthened the dollar and
increased the relative prices of United States goods and services abroad. 123
If interest rates were lowered, United States products would be more
competitive with those of other nations and its trade deficit would proba-
bly decrease. This solution is limited, however, since it focuses on the trade
deficit and does not remove trade barriers within other nations.
Bilateral Agreements
United States Trade Representative Brock has expressed his hope that the
United States will conclude bilateral agreements with other nations similar
to the NTT agreement with Japan. 124 Under the NTT agreement Japan
promised to bring the procurement procedures of Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Company into conformity with the provisions of the Govern-
ment Procurement Code. 125 After lengthy negotiations, Japan placed $8
billion of its government telecommunications procurement under the
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Code. Another $1.8 billion of NTT's telecommunications procurement was
placed under the NTT agreement. 126 Under that agreement Japan must
allow United States firms to bid on contracts to furnish telecommunica-
tions equipment, and all bids must be considered on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
Similarly, the United States could offer to include more American enti-
ties in the Government Procurement Code as leverage in bilateral negotia-
tions with other nations. 127 Such negotiations are consistent with GATT
obligations and with the United States policy of trade on a mutually
beneficial basis. In the long run, contracting with other nations to reduce
their barriers in exchange for a reduction of barriers in the United States
is more likely to produce continued and amicable trade relations in the
telecommunications industry than are threats and retaliatory actions.
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the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, Part , 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 683 (1982) (statement of Congressman Timothy Wirth
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of Colorado) [hereinafter cited as HR.5158 Hearings ], without hearings or debate, id. at 839
(statement of Matthew Nimetz, partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison). The bill
was passed by the Senate in October, 1981 and referred to the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, where it died.
10 H.R.5158, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Its reciprocity provision, section 267, was taken
from the language of S.898 section 238. See Wirth, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 683. On
July 20, 1982, Representative Wirth, the bill's sponsor, withdrew the bill from House Energy
and Commerce Committee consideration because of AT & T's opposition. Pus. UnL. FORT.,
Aug. 19, 1982, at 46.
11 See, e.g., Trezise, Let's Not Play the Bully in World Trade, Wash. Post, Feb. 11, 1982, at--("The
international trading system gave bilateral balancing an extended trial during the 1930s.
Through quotas, exchange controls and outright barter [states] tried to avoid having deficits
with anyone. That disastrous experience was the background for the post-World War II
return to the multilateral idea, embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.");
see also, Brock, Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 29.
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXVIII(1), 61 Stat. 5,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 278.
13 Brock, Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 24.
1 4 .5ee, e.g., Trade Act of 1974 § 104, 19 U.S.C. § 2114(a) (1976) ("A principle United States
negotiating objective ... shall be to obtain ... competitive opportunities for United States
exports... equivalent to the competitive opportunities afforded in United States markets [to
foreign imports] . ..").
Is See, e.g., H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 8, at 688 (Brock would seek reciprocity through
negotiation, not legislation); Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 60 (statement of Senator
Bill Bradley of New Jersey).
16 Trade Reciprocity 11: Hearing on S.2094 Before the Subcomm. on International Trade of the Senate Comm.
on Finance, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1982) (statement of Howard Samuel, President of Indus-
trial Union Department, AFL-CIO; and Claude Hobbs, Vice President, Government Rela-
tions, Westinghouse Electric Corporation, on behalf of the Labor-Industry Coalition for
International Trade) [hereinafter cited as S.2094 Hearing].
17 Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1 at 3 (statement of Senator John Heinz of Pennsyl-
vania).
18 See Boren, id. at 5.
19 For analyses of deregulation in the United States telecommunications industry, see
H.R.5158 Hearings, Parts 1-3, supra note 9; Telecommunications and Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings
on S.898 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)
[hereinafter cited as S.898 Hearings]; TELECOMMNlCATONS IN TRANSITION, HoUss Comm. PRINT,
supra note 8; Johnson & Thomas, Deregulation and Divestiture in a Changing Telecommunications
Industry, PUB. UTIu. FORT., Oct. 14, 1982, at 17; Trienens, Deregulation in the Telecommunications
Industry, 50 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 409 (1981-1982).
20 Wirth, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 683. Domestic firms were already concerned
about foreign competition in the U.S. telecommunications market. According to an AT & T
spokesman, direct foreign investment in the telecommunications business almost doubled
from 1978 to 1979-to $1.6 billion. See S.898 Hearings, supra note 19, at 388 (statement of
William P. Stritzler, Assistant Vice President of AT & T). Sixteen of the world's top twenty-
five telecommunications equipment suppliers are foreign-owned. H.R.s158 Hearings, supra note
9, at 750 (statement of Robert E. Sageman, President of AT & T International).
21 See Baldrige, S.898 Hearings, supra note 19, at 123 and 127; Brock, id. at 641.
22 Baldrige, id. at 127.
23 Sageman, HR.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 744.
24 Telecommunications and Information Products and Services in International Trade: Hearing Before the
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Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 106 (1981) (statement of John Soldolski, Vice President of
Electronic Industries) [hereinafter cited as Telecommunications Hearings ].
25 H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 727 (statement of Edmund Fitzgerald, President of
Northern Telecom, Inc.).
26 Id. at 736 (statement of Robert J. Gressens, President of GTE International).
27 Id.
28 See Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 24, at 106 (statement of Geza Feketekuty,
Assistant United States Trade Representative).
29 GATT, Agreement on Government Procurement, art. II(1), April 12, 1979,-U.S.T.-,
T.I.A.S. No. 10403; see also Brown, The New International Government Procurement Code Under GA TT,
53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 198 (1981); Goldstein, Doing Business Under The Agreement On Government Procure-
ment: The Telecommunications Business - A Case In Point, 55 ST. Jov's L. REv. 63 (1980); Pomerantz,
Toward a New International Order in Government Procurement, 12 PuB. CoNT. L.J. 129 (1982).
3 0 ee Brock, 5.898 Hearings, supra note 19, at 641 ("We currently have very little negotiating
leverage in the field of telecommunications services which can be used to obtain greater access
to foreign communications markets ... the President has no power to retaliate against a
foreign telecommunications barrier or deny access to the U.S. market."); see also Feketekuty,
Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 24, at 106-107.
31 S.2094 Hearings, supra note 16, at 117 (statement of Edson de Castro, President of Data
General Corp.).
32 See id. at 116-17 (Local subsidiaries are often needed to service complicated equipment,
train purchasers in the use of the equipment and provide continuous information services).
33 See Feketekuty, Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 24, at 61-62; see also id. at 102
(statement of Donald Lehrman, President of General Datacom Industries) (Japan requires that
foreign suppliers must provide a protective box with their modems before connection with
a telephone line is allowed; thus, customers buying from foreign companies in Japan must
pick up the extra cost of the protective box and are less likely to buy from non-domestic
companies).
34 See Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 24, at 86-98.
35 E.g., administrative policies which prohibit leasing of private telecommunications cir-
cuits in order to increase the use of government-owned public circuits; restrictive government
approval for international links for teleprocessing systems; and laws requiring local process-
ing of data prior to its transmission outside the country.
36 See supra note 9. The main reciprocity provision of S.898, § 238, reads as follows:
For the purpose of ensuring fair and equitable treatment of United States telecom-
munications enterprises seeking access to foreign markets, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission shall have the authority to conduct inquiries and establish policies,
rules, regulations and requirements applicable to the entry of foreign persons supply-
ing telecommunications or information service, facilities, or equipment into domestic
United States communications markets upon terms and conditions under which United States
persons are permitted entry into:
(1) the foreign nation in which the operations of such foreign persons offering telecom-
munications or information services, facilities or equipment is based; and
(2) the foreign nation under the laws of which such foreign telecommunications or
information services facilities or equipment operations are established. (emphasis
added.)
37 See supra note 10. The main reciprocity provision, § 267, reads as follows:
For the purpose of ensuring fair and equitable treatment of United States persons
seeking access to foreign markets, the [Federal Communications] Commission shall
establish policies, rules, regulations, and requirements prescribing terms and condi-
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tions for foreign enterprises supplying telecommunications services or facilities in the
United States markets which are reciprocal with the terms and conditions under which United
States persons are permitted to operate in:
(1) the foreign nation in which the operations of such foreign enterprise offering
telecommunications services or facilities is based; and
(2) the foreign nation under the laws of which international transmissions or enhanced
services offered by such foreign enterprise originate, terminate, or are regulated. (em-
phasis added.)
38 The relevant language, contained in section 238(c)(1)(B), reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any existing or prospective agreement on telecommunications
equipment procurement with a foreign country, such country shall not been [sic]
deemed to provide reciprocity in access to markets, operations, and rights of ownership
unless it is in compliance with such agreement, provides full access to United States
telecommunications equipment manufacturers under terms and conditions which do
not distort research and development, investment, sales or marketing, and does not
encourage or condone practices by its domestic manufacturers or government officials,
the effect of which would be to inhibit the sales of United States telecommunications
equipment in such country.
Section 267(c) is virtually identical.
39 H.R.5158 § 301(46) defines reciprocal rights as follows: "'Reciprocal rights' means
those rights, terms, and conditions established for United States telecommunications and
information services, facilities, or equipment in foreign markets which are reasonably equiva-
lent to those established for foreign enterprises in United States markets, including access to
and establishment in such markets." S.898 § 103(32) defines reciprocal rights in much the
same way.
40 See S.898 § 238(c)(3); H.R.5158 § 267(g).
41 S.898 § 238(c)(1)(A); H.R.5158 § 267(b). Both subsections also provide for revision of
the list when relevant foreign laws or practices change.
4 2 See S.898 § 232(c)(4) (authorizes the FCC to deny certification of any customer-premises
equipment in the appropriate circumstances).
43 See H.R.5158 § 267(d) (authorizes the FCC to deny interconnection rights to terminal
equipment in the appropriate circumstances).
44 See supra notes 36 and 37.
45 See id.
46 See supra note 37.
47 See supra note 36.
48 See supra notes 36 and 37.
49 See S.898 § 238(d), which states:
The President may, within 45 days after approval or disapproval by the Commission
of an application by a foreign telecommunications carrier or information supplier, veto
such decision for foreign policy reasons if, after consultation with the Secretary of
Commerce, the Office of the United States Trade Representative, and the Secretary of
State, the President determines that such action is contrary to the national interests
of the United States.
Section 238 contains another unique provision. It encourages "the procurement of foreign
telecommunications equipment ... from foreign manufacturers located in countries which
extend reciprocity to U.S. telecommunications equipment manufacturers." See S.898 §
238(c)(2).
50 See H.R.5158 § 267(h).
51 See Brock, Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 38; Samuel and Hobbs, S.2094 Hearing,
supra note 16, at 168.
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52 See, e.g., Brock, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 686 ("It is a basic fact of life that
national economies differ. Countries do not produce or necessarily have the capability to
produce everything.... We knew that we could not negotiate access to the Japanese market
for U.S. wheat producers by offering access to our market for wheat to the Japanese. They
are in no position to export wheat to us and would understandably be reluctant to accept such
a deal."); id. at 707-708 (statement of Ernest Johnston, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State); S.2094 Hearing, supra note 16, at 337 (statement of American International Automobile
Dealers Association) ("Product or sectoral equivalence in bilateral trade relations is infeasible
because it ignores the principle of comparative advantage, i.e., all countries export products
they produce relatively efficiently and import products they produce relatively inefficiently;
product or sectoral imbalances are therefore inevitable among countries.").
53 See, e.g., American International Automobile Dealers Association, S.2094 Hearing, supra
note 16, at 337-338.
54 Johnston, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 709; id. at 823 (statement of Stanton D.
Anderson on behalf of Communications Industries Association of Japan); see also Brock, Trade
Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 28; Hay & Sulzenko, supra note 5 (Canadian view of
reciprocity and retaliation).
55 See Nimetz, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 838 and 841; id. at 718 (statements of
Johnston and Congressman Edward J. Markey of Massachusetts).
56 See Brock, Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 39.
57 See S.2094 Hearing, supra note 16, at 239 (statement of Howard Weisberg, Director of
International Trade Policy, United States Chamber of Commerce).
58 See, e.g., American International Automobile Dealers Association, id. at 335; Johnston,
H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 706.
59 See S. REP. ON 898, supra note 9, at 159 (statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South
Carolina). The United States also maintains restrictions on imports of cheese, cotton, sugar,
and dairy products, see 7 C.F.R. § 6 (1982), as well as other items. See Johnston, H.R.5158
Hearings, supra note 9, at 706; American International Automobile Dealers Association, 5.2094
Hearings, supra note 16, at 335.
60 See American International Automobile Dealers Association, 5.2094 Hearing, supra note
16, at 335; id. at 288-289 (statement of the Business Roundtable).
61 See, e.g., Trezise, supra note 11.
62 Telephone interview with staff of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of
Commerce (February 21, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Bureau of Economic Analysis].
63 See 5.2094 Hearing, supra note 16, at 158-159 (statement of Edson W. Spencer of Honey-
well, Inc. on behalf of the Emergency Committee for American Trade).
64 See generally JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC PoucY m THe 1980's 46 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter cited as JOINT ECONOMIC
Comm. REP. 1982].
65 Id. at 46; see also Doan, A Global Trade War on the Way? U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, March
1, 1982, at 58.
66 Current Exchange Rate Relationship of the U.S. Dollar And The Japanese Yen: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982) (statement of Fred
Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International Economics).
67 See, e.g., Samuel and Hobbs, S.2094 Hearing, supra note 16, at 175.
68 Bureau of Economic Analysis, supra note 62.
69 See, e.g., Brock, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 690 (Roughly 50 percent of the United
States trade deficit with Japan results from automobile imports from Japan); id. at 700 (oil
imports are by far the largest contributor to the deficit).
70 The telecommunications equipment trade surplus in 1980 was approximately $836
million. Anderson, id. at 806, and Nimetz, id. at 838.
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71 See TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION, HOUsE COMM. PRINT, supra note 8, at 175.
72 Reciprocal Trade and Market Access Ligislation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1982) (statement of Lionel H. Olmer, Under
Secretary of Commerce for International Trade) [hereinafter cited as Market Access Hearing ].
73 See JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 55.
74 HR.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 773 (statement of Henry Marcheschi, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of American Telecom, Inc.).
75 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. REP., supra note 64, at 55.
76 See supra notes 36-37.
77 See Johnston, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 714; Anderson, id. at 815.
78 See supra notes 36-37.
79 "Tariffs" include the charges, terms and conditions for services by each carrier. See S.
REP. ON 898, supra note 9, at 79.
80 See id.; Federal Communications Commission Oversight: Hearings Before The Government Information
and Individual Rights Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 29
(1981) (statement of Mark Fowler, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission)
[hereinafter cited as FCC Oversight Hearings ].
81 See S. RaP. ON 898, supra note 9, at 79; Fowler, FCC Oversight Hearings, supra note 80, at 55.
82 Fowler, FCC Oversight Hearings, supra note 80, at 55-56.
83 Id. at 56.
84 See, e.g., Brock, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 693; Johnston, id. at 703; Anderson,
id. at 962.
85 See Johnston, id. at 703; Anderson, id. at 799.
86 S.898 § 238(c)(3), supra note 9; H.R.5158 § 267(g), supra note 10.
87 H.R.5158 § 267(e).
88 See supra note 49.
89 Anderson, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 799; see also Johnston, id. at 709.
90 See Johnston, id. at 703.
91 Id. at 959 (statement of Congressman James H. Scheuer of New York); see generally G.
GUNHER, CoNsTITmONAL LAw 402-410 (10th ed. 1980); J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS 78-120 (1977).
92 Se Nimetz, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 844; id. at 895 (statement of Paul, Weiss,
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison on behalf of Nippon Electric Co., Ltd. and NEC America, Inc.)
[hereinafter cited as Paul, Weiss].
93 See Anderson, id. at 962.
94 S.898 § 103(15) states: "'Foreign telecommunications carrier' or 'enterprise' or 'entity'
means any telecommunications carrier or enterprise or entity of which at least 20 percent of
the capital stock or equivalent ownership is owned or controlled by a foreign person or a
domestic person acting in behalf of a foreign person."
95 H.R.5158 § 301(36) states: "'Foreign enterprise' means any corporation at least 20
percent of which is owned by any foreign person, except to the extent that such enterprise
provided exchange or interexchange service on January 1, 1982."
96 See Marcheschi, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 775-776.
97 See Anderson, id. at 816; Paul, Weiss, id. at 865.
98 See Paul, Weiss, id. at 864; Marcheschi, id. at 775.
99 See Fitzgerald, id. at 727.
100 See supra note 37.
101 See supra note 38.
102 See supra text accompanying note 49.
103 See Paul, Weiss, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 903-04.
104 See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
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107 See supra note 12, at art. 1(1).
108 Id. at art. XXIII.
109 Id. at art. III.
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112 Se supra note 38.
113 NTT is the abbreviation for Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, the Japanese govern-
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ly Note, United States-Japan Trade Developments Under the AIN Agreement on Government Procurement,
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Jan. 1, 1981,-U.S.T.-, T.I.A.S. No. 9961.
115 See supra note 12, at art. XXIII:
116 Trade Reciprocily Hearing, supra note 1, at 71-72 (statement of Consumers for World
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117 See supra note 12, at arts. I-XXXVIII; see also Baldrige, Trade Reciprocily Hearing, supra note
1, at 42; Note, Liberalization of International Trade in the Service Sector: Threshold Problems and a Proposed
Framaork Under the GA TT, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 371 (1982) (analysis of the difficulties of
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118 Baldrige, Trade Reciprocity Hearing, supra note 1, at 47.
119 Brock, id. at 50.
120 See Brock, H.R.5158 Hearings, supra note 9, at 685.
121 Feketekuty, Telecommunications Hearings, supra note 24, at 107.
122 Id. at 107-08.
123 See supra text accompanying notes 63-66.
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